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I. INTRODUCTION

Courts have recently begun grappling with a new issue in cases
brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) and
the Jones Act: what sort of credit, if any, should a jointly and
severally liable FELA or Jones Act defendant receive for
settlements that the plaintiff has made with negligent third
parties?1 Although this is a relatively new issue in FELA cases,
courts have long considered this issue in other areas of federal
law.2 In the seminal 1994 case of McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, the
United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s recoverable
damages from a jointly and severally liable maritime defendant
should be reduced by the proportionate share of damages
attributable to a settling defendant.3 Under this method, the
nonsettling defendant receives a “settlement credit” (also known as
a “set-off”) in proportion to the settling defendant’s share of the
injury, regardless of how much money the plaintiff actually
recovered from the settling defendant.4 The AmClyde Court
1. See Schadel v. Iowa Interstate R.R., Ltd., 381 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2004)
(FELA); Benson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 274 Fed. App’x 273 (4th Cir. 2008)
(FELA); Lewin v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 389 (N.D. Ohio 2004)
(Jones Act); Krueger v. Soo Line R.R., No. 02-C-0611, 2005 WL 2234610 (E.D.
Wis. Sept. 12, 2005) (FELA); Mancini v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 08-CV-933,
2010 WL 2985964 (N.D. N.Y. July 27, 2010) (FELA); Torrejon v. Mobil Oil
Co., 876 So.2d 877 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2004) (Jones Act); Palmer v. Union Pacific
R. Co., 311 S.W. 3d 843 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (FELA); Hess v. Norfolk
Southern Ry. Co., 835 N.E. 2d 679 (Ohio 2005) (FELA).
2. See, e.g., McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994) (adopting
a proportionate share approach); Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d
1246 (5th Cir. 1979) (adopting a proportionate share approach); Self v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1987) (adopting a pro
tanto approach); see also Gus A. Schill, Jr., Recent Developments Regarding
Maritime Contribution and Indemnity, 51 LA. L. REV. 975, 987 (1991)
(discussing the history of the set-off debate before AmClyde); W. Robins Brice,
Solidarity and Contribution in Maritime Claims, 55 LA. L. REV. 799 (1995)
(discussing the issue in light of AmClyde).
3. AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 217.
4. Id. at 210.
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favored this set-off rule over the proposed alternative: the “pro
tanto method,” under which the nonsettling defendant would
receive a settlement credit for only the amount actually paid by the
settling defendant, regardless of the level of fault attributable to
each party.5
To illustrate the way the “pro tanto method” operates (and its
potential to lead to inequity among defendants), the AmClyde
Court posed the following hypothetical:
Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff sues two defendants,
each equally responsible, and settles with one for $250,000.
At trial, the non-settling defendant is found liable, and
plaintiff’s damages are assessed at $1 million. Under the
pro tanto rule, the nonsettling defendant would be liable for
75% of the damages ($750,000, which is $1 million minus
$250,000). The litigating defendant is thus responsible for
far more than its proportionate share of the damages.6
The possibility of such inequity among defendants was one of
the many reasons that the AmClyde Court embraced the
proportionate share rule over the pro tanto method.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in AmClyde, the
majority of state and federal courts have adopted the proportionate
share method, rather than the pro tanto method, in the areas of the
law that still call for joint and several liability.7 But, in recent
years, an exception has emerged in one area of the law: FELA
cases8 (and shortly thereafter, in Jones Act cases).9 This
development arose in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2003
5. Id. at 208.
6. Id. at 212 n.14.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 16
cmt. c (2000); see, e.g., Bragger v. Trinity Capital Enterp. Corp., 30 F.3d 14, 17
(2d Cir. 1994) (securities litigation); Banks ex rel. Banks v. Yokemick, 177 F.
Supp. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act); In re
WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litigation, 339 F. Supp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(ERISA); see also Martin Davies, McDermott v. AmClyde: The Quiet Achiever,
39 J. MAR. L. & COM. 11, 12 (2008) (noting the influence of AmClyde in other
areas of state and federal law, and commenting that “[p]erhaps only Robins Dry
Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint has had more influence outside of maritime law”).
8. See cases cited supra note 1.
9. This Article discusses a specific line of cases that have adopted the pro
tanto approach. Most of these cases are FELA cases. Therefore, the majority of
this Article discusses the FELA, rather than the Jones Act. However, because
the Jones Act incorporates the standards of the FELA, see infra Part III.A, the
FELA cases discussed in this Article will likely have an influence on Jones Act
claims as well. In fact, this issue has already arisen in two Jones Act cases. See
Lewin v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 389 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Torrejon v.
Mobil Oil Co., 876 So.2d 877 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2004).
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decision in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers, which held
that a FELA defendant is not entitled to a reduction of damages for
the negligence of a third party.10 Notably, the Court’s decision in
Ayers did not involve the situation discussed above, in which one
of the defendants has already settled. Rather, in Ayers, neither the
FELA defendant nor the allegedly negligent third parties had
reached a settlement with the plaintiff.11 Even so, several lower
courts have held that the rationale of Ayers requires application of
the pro tanto set-off rule, rather than AmClyde’s proportionate
share method.12 The most notable of these cases is the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Schadel v. Iowa Interstate Railroad, Ltd.,
which was the first case to address the issue and which has
subsequently been followed by most other jurisdictions that have
addressed the issue.13 In these cases, courts have applied the pro
tanto set-off method, requiring FELA defendants to pay more than
their share of the damages in order to make up for the plaintiff’s
having settled for too little.14
This Article argues that Schadel and its progeny are incorrect.
The well-established proportionate share set-off method,
unanimously adopted by the Supreme Court in AmClyde, should
determine the amount of credit a FELA defendant receives for the
settlement of a third party. Schadel was incorrect in holding that
Ayers requires an abrogation of the AmClyde rule in FELA cases.
Although Ayers emphasized that joint and several liability is still
the rule in FELA cases, the opinion said nothing regarding
settlement credits or the effect of a plaintiff’s settlement with a
negligent third party. Furthermore, the rationale of Ayers is not
10. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 165 (2003).
11. See id. at 159–66.
12. See Schadel v. Iowa Interstate R.R., Ltd., 381 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2004)
(FELA); Benson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 274 Fed. App’x 273 (4th Cir. 2008)
(FELA); Lewin v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 389 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (a
Jones Act case reasoning that the maritime nature of the claim required
application of AmClyde, not Ayers, but nevertheless applying a pro tanto
approach on the theory that the calculation of a proportionate share set-off was
“unreasonable” under the facts of the case); Krueger v. Soo Line R.R., No. 02C-0611, 2005 WL 2234610 (E.D. Wis. Sep. 12, 2005) (FELA); Mancini v. CSX
Transp., Inc., No. 08-CV-933, 2010 WL 2985964 (N.D.N.Y. July 27, 2010)
(FELA); Torrejon v. Mobil Oil Co., 876 So.2d 877 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2004)
(Jones Act); Palmer v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311 S.W. 3d 843 (Mo. Ct. App.
2010) (FELA); Hess v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 835 N.E. 2d 679 (Ohio 2005)
(FELA). But see Palmer v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311 S.W.3d 843 (Mo. Ct. App.
2010) (expressly disagreeing with the above line of cases and holding that a
nonsettling FELA defendant was not entitled to any set-off for the settlement of
a negligent third party).
13. Schadel, 381 F.3d at 678.
14. Id.; see also supra note 12.
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applicable in settlement scenarios for two reasons: first, as the
Supreme Court has emphasized, the doctrine of joint and several
liability exists to protect the plaintiff from outside forces such as a
defendant’s insolvency, but not from the plaintiff’s own agreement
to settle.15 Second, settlement scenarios change the analysis
because, unlike the scenario in Ayers, once a negligent third party
has settled, the FELA defendant will be left without a valid action
for contribution against the settling third party.16 For these reasons,
this Article argues that courts faced with FELA or Jones Act
claims should decline to adopt the Schadel approach and should
instead follow the set-off method that the Supreme Court has
already prescribed: AmClyde’s proportionate share method.
Part II of this Article introduces the general rule for calculating
settlement credits: AmClyde’s proportionate share method. Part III
discusses Schadel and its progeny and analyzes those cases’
application of the pro tanto set-off rule. Part IV argues that
Schadel and its progeny are incorrect and asserts that courts should
apply AmClyde’s proportionate share set-off rule in FELA and
Jones Act cases.
II. THE GENERAL RULE: THE “PROPORTIONATE SHARE” METHOD OF
SET-OFF
For many years, circuit courts and legal commentators
deliberated over the proper method for calculating a settlement
credit.17 But in 1994 the Supreme Court settled the debate with its
unanimous decision in the case McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde.18
Although AmClyde was neither a FELA nor Jones Act case, courts
have adopted its approach as the general rule for calculating
settlement credits in areas of both state and federal law that still
15. AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 221.
16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979)
(adopting a proportionate share approach); Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 832 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1987) (adopting a pro tanto approach);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 886A
(1977) (discussing both the pro tanto and proportionate share methods but
declining to express a preference for either rule); Daniel Klerman, Settling
Multidefendant Lawsuits: The Advantage of Conditional Setoff Rules, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 445 (1996) (“the conditional pro tanto rule pressures both
defendants to settle for relatively high amounts”); Lewis A. Kornhauser &
Richard L. Revesz, Settlements Under Joint and Several Liability, 68 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 427 (1993) (“neither [set-off] rule is consistently better than the other”);
Schill, supra note 2, at 987 (discussing the history of the set-off debate before
AmClyde).
18. AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 221.
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retain joint and several liability (as do the FELA and Jones Act
do).19 Therefore, this Article will devote considerable attention to
the Supreme Court’s decision in AmClyde.
A. McDermott v. AmClyde: The Supreme Court Embraces the
“Proportionate Share” Method of Set-Off
AmClyde addressed an accident on an offshore oil platform that
involved various defendants and several million dollars in
damages.20 While a crane owned by McDermott was lifting a
prefabricated platform dock, the crane’s main hook malfunctioned.
A large steel cable sling unraveled, and the platform dock crashed
down onto its transport barge, causing significant damage.
McDermott sued AmClyde, the manufacturer of the crane, along
with the manufacturer of the crane’s hook that broke, and three
manufacturers of the crane’s steel cable slings (known as the “sling
defendants”). Prior to trial, the sling defendants settled for $1
million. At trial, the jury found that McDermott had suffered $2.1
million in damages, allocating 32% of the fault to AmClyde and
38% to the manufacturer of the crane’s defective hook.21
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court faced the
question of what sort of credit the nonsettling defendants should
receive for the plaintiff’s settlement with the sling defendants.22
The Court approached this question with a clean slate, noting
Congress had not provided any guidance on the issue.23 Therefore,
the Court turned to another source: the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.24 As the Court noted, the Restatement did not take a position
on this issue, but provided three basic options: (1) pro tanto with
contribution: the nonsettling defendant gets credit only for the
amount actually paid by the settling defendant, and if the settling
defendant paid less than his share, the nonsettling defendant may
seek contribution from the settling defendant; (2) pro tanto without
contribution: the nonsettling defendant gets credit only for the
amount actually paid by the settling defendant, and may not seek
contribution from a settling defendant who paid less than his share;
and (3) proportionate share: a nonsettling defendant receives credit
for the settling defendant’s share of liability, regardless of how
19. See sources cited supra note 7.
20. AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 205.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 207.
23. Id.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §
886A (1977).
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much the settling defendant actually paid.25 With these three setoff rules in mind, the Court weighed the pros and cons of each
option.
The Court quickly rejected the first option, pro tanto with
contribution, reasoning that it was “clearly inferior to the other
two, because it discourages settlement and leads to unnecessary
ancillary litigation.”26 The Court noted that it discouraged
settlements “because settlement can only disadvantage the settling
defendant”—in other words, a defendant would have nothing to
gain by settling, because a contribution action by the nonsettling
defendant could ultimately make the settling defendant liable for
his full share of the damages anyway.27 In addition, “the claim for
contribution burdens the courts with additional litigation,” the
Court noted.28
Having dismissed the pro tanto with contribution method, the
Court turned its attention to the other two set-off options. The
Court quickly noted that the pro tanto approach would often lead
to the nonsettling defendant paying more than its equitable share of
the damages. The Court reasoned that plaintiffs often settle for an
amount that is “significantly less than the settling defendant’s
equitable share of the loss, because settlement reflects the
uncertainty of trial and provides the plaintiff with a ‘war chest’
with which to finance the litigation against the remaining
defendants.”29 And under the pro tanto method, when a plaintiff
settles for this discounted amount, the nonsettling defendant is left
to make up for the difference. Such a regime might have the
beneficial effect of encouraging settlements, but only at the cost of
wreaking inequity, the Court reasoned.30 For that reason, the Court
concluded that it was “persuaded that the proportionate share
approach is superior.”31
After reaching this conclusion, the Court took great pains to
emphasize that its holding did not abrogate the longstanding rule of
joint and several liability in admiralty law,32 which had recently
been reaffirmed by the Court’s opinion in Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique.33 In Edmonds, the Court refused to
reduce the judgment against a shipowner by the proportionate fault
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 208–209.
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 214–15.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 218.
443 U.S. 256 (1979).
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of a stevedore whose liability was limited by the Longshoremen’s
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). Instead, the
Court allowed the plaintiff to collect the entirety of his damages
from the shipowner.34 Notably, the AmClyde Court distinguished
Edmonds based on the fact that “Edmonds did not address the issue
in this case, the effect of a settlement on nonsettling defendants.
Indeed, there was no settlement in that case.”35 For this reason, the
Court held that the rationale of Edmonds did not prevent a
proportionate share set-off in AmClyde, because Edmonds “merely
reaffirm[ed] the well-established principle of joint and several
liability”—and as the Court emphasized “there is no tension
between joint and several liability and a proportionate share
approach to settlements.”36
The AmClyde Court explained that joint and several liability
requires a defendant to pay more than his share of the damages
“when the plaintiff’s recovery from other defendants is limited by
factors beyond the plaintiff’s control, such as a defendant’s
insolvency.”37 However, the Court held that joint and several
liability does not impose such burdens on a defendant when “the
plaintiff’s recovery against the settling defendant has been limited
not by outside forces, but by its own agreement to settle. There is
no reason to allocate any shortfall to the other defendants, who
were not parties to the settlement.”38 The AmClyde Court reasoned
that the proportionate share method provided the most equitable
result: just as nonsettling defendants “are not entitled to a reduction
in liability when the plaintiff negotiates a generous settlement, so
they are not required to shoulder disproportionate liability when
the plaintiff negotiates a meager one.”39
By distinguishing the rationale in Edmonds, the AmClyde Court
emphasized an important distinction between two different types of
apportioning fault: first, the type of apportionment that occurs
when a court divides the damages owed by two or more
nonsettling defendants at the judgment of a trial (a procedure that
the Court did not allow in Edmonds); and second, apportionment
that occurs in the calculation of a proportionate share set-off,
which gives a nonsettling defendant the appropriate amount of
credit for the plaintiff’s settlement with a negligent third party (a
procedure that the Court unanimously embraced in AmClyde).40
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 271–73.
AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 220.
Id.
Id. at 221.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 220–21.
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Under the AmClyde Court’s rationale, the doctrine of joint and
several liability prohibits the former type of apportionment, but not
the latter. This Article will revisit the distinction between these two
types of apportionment in Part IV, which provides a critique of the
Schadel court’s rejection of AmClyde.
B. AmClyde’s Legacy: the “Proportionate Share” Method Emerges
as the General Rule of Setoff in Federal Joint and Several Liability
Cases
After the Supreme Court issued its ruling in AmClyde, the case
quickly became a staple of everyday maritime practice. 41 As one
maritime expert recently commented, “[w]henever there is a partial
settlement of a multiparty maritime case, the McDermott rule
shapes the parties’ behavior, and so it is probably no exaggeration
to say that McDermott is considered by some practicing lawyer
somewhere every day.”42
But, AmClyde’s influence has not been limited to the field of
admiralty. Rather, AmClyde is routinely cited and applied in other
areas of federal law that employ joint and several liability, such as
ERISA, securities fraud, and claims under § 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act.43 And in non-maritime tort claims, the proportionate
share approach to partial settlement is generally the rule in states
that still adhere to joint and several liability among tortfeasors, and
several of those states have arrived at that result by citing and
applying AmClyde.44
Notably, there is one additional area in which courts have often
applied AmClyde: Jones Act cases.45 At first blush, this might seem
obvious, given that AmClyde was an admiralty case. But as the
reader will recall, AmClyde was not a Jones Act case, but a
property damage case brought under the general maritime law.
Even so, state and federal courts have routinely applied AmClyde’s
proportionate share method to seamen’s personal injury claims
brought under maritime theories such as unseaworthiness, and,

41. See generally Davies, supra note 7.
42. Id. at 12.
43. Id.; see also cases cited supra note 7.
44. Davies, supra note 7 at 12; see also cases cited supra note 7.
45. See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt
Miller, 92 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 1996); Nunez v. B&B Dredging. Inc., 108 F.
Supp. 2d 656 (E.D. La. 2000); Slaven v. BP Am. Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1472 (C.D.
Cal. 1997); Geyer v. USX Corp., 896 F. Supp. 1440 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Miller
v. Int’l. Diving and Consulting Servs., Inc., 669 So. 2d 1246 (La. Ct. App. 5th
1996).
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most relevant to this Article, the Jones Act.46 Presumably, courts
were comfortable adopting AmClyde in maritime personal injury
cases because Jones Act claims (as well as claims for
unseaworthiness) are controlled by joint and several liability, just
like the claims in AmClyde. However, some recent cases have
broken this trend and applied the pro tanto set-off rule to Jones Act
claims.47 Those decisions followed the Seventh Circuit’s approach
in Schadel, a case addressed below.
III. THE EXCEPTION: FELA AND JONES ACT CASES BEGIN TO
ADOPT THE ALTERNATIVE “PRO TANTO” METHOD OF SET-OFF
After the Supreme Court issued its ruling in AmClyde, lower
courts consistently applied the proportionate share method, rather
than the pro tanto method, in other areas of federal law that call for
joint and several liability.48 But, in the past few years, a line of
cases has emerged that has carved out an exception for FELA and
Jones Act cases.49 To explain the emergence of this exception, Part
III will provide a brief background of the FELA and the Jones Act,
as well as a discussion of the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in
Norfolk v. Ayers and the Seventh Circuit’s 2004 decision in
Schadel v. Iowa Interstate Railroad.
A. FELA (and the Jones Act): A Brief Primer
A brief background of the FELA is necessary to understand
why some courts have rejected AmClyde’s proportionate share rule
in favor of the pro tanto method of set-off. Congress enacted the
FELA in 1908 as a fault-based statute designed to compensate
railroad workers who had suffered work-related injuries and to
“shif[t] part of the ‘human overhead’ of doing business from
employees to their employers.”50 FELA provides a claim for
injuries resulting “in whole or in part from the negligence of” the
railroad.51 At the time that the FELA was enacted, workers’
compensation laws did not exist for injured employees in other
46. See cases cited supra note 45.
47. See cases cited supra note 12.
48. See sources cited supra note 7.
49. See cases cited supra note 12.
50. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542 (1994) (quoting
Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58 (1943)); see also Victor E.
Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Toppling the House of Cards That Flowed From
an Unsound Supreme Court Decision: End Inadmissibility of Railroad
Disability Benefits in FELA Cases, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 105, 112 (2003).
51. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
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industries.52 Rather, the only method of recovery for injured
workers was the common law doctrine of negligence.53 At the
time, common law tort principles made recovery by an injured
employee very difficult, as the doctrines of contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk often prevented employees from
prevailing in court.54
Because workers’ compensation laws did not exist at the time,
Congress crafted the FELA based on common law negligence
principles.55 But, in order to ensure a reasonably reliable
compensation system, Congress eased recovery for injured railroad
workers by “(1) doing away with both the fellow-servant rule and
the doctrine of assumption of risk, and (2) replacing the common
law principle of contributory negligence as a complete defense
with a rule of comparative negligence.”56 FELA also retains the
common law doctrine of joint and several liability, meaning an
injured worker can recover the entirety of his damages from a
railroad, even if the worker’s injury was caused jointly by the fault
of the railroad and a third party.57
So far, this Part has focused on the FELA. But all of the above
FELA standards apply with equal force to another federal statute:
the Jones Act. The Jones Act was passed in 1920 to grant injured
seamen a cause of action against their employers for negligence.58
The Jones Act states that “[l]aws of the United States regulating
recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee
apply to an action under this section.”59 In other words, the Jones
Act grants injured seamen the right to seek damages against their
employers under the same standards by which the FELA allows
claims by railroad employees.60 Thus, the key features of the
FELA discussed above—the abolition of traditional common law
defenses and the retention of joint and several liability—apply with
equal force under the Jones Act.61 This highlights “an important
52. See Jerry J. Phillips, An Evaluation of the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 49, 50 (1988); Thomas E. Baker, Why Congress
Should Repeal the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, 29 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 79, 82 (1992).
53. See Phillips, supra note 52, at 50.
54. See id.; Baker, supra note 52, at 82; see also CSX Transp., Inc. v.
McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2638 (2010).
55. See Baker, supra note 52, at 80–82.
56. Id. at 82.
57. See Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 138 (2003).
58. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 6-21 (5th
ed. 2011).
59. 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104 (West Supp. 2011).
60. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 58, at § 6-21.
61. Id.
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lesson for the maritime lawyer: any decision interpreting the FELA
is a ‘must read’ for the maritime lawyer because of the Jones Act’s
incorporation of the FELA.”62
B. Norfolk v. Ayers: The Supreme Court Reaffirms Joint and
Several Liability for FELA Cases
One of the Supreme Court’s most recent interpretations of the
FELA came in its 2003 decision in Norfolk & Western Railway
Company v. Ayers.63 That case is probably best known for its
holding that mental anguish damages resulting from the fear of
developing cancer may be available under the FELA by a railroad
worker who has been exposed to asbestos.64 However, relevant to
this Article, the Ayers Court also addressed a second question:
when there is evidence that a plaintiff’s injury has non-railroad
causes, does the FELA permit reasonable apportionment so that the
railroad is responsible only for those damages attributable to its
own negligence?65 The careful reader will notice that this question,
presented in Ayers, is distinguishable from the subject of this
Article in an important way: it mentions nothing about settlement.
In Part III, this Article will argue that this distinction makes Ayers
irrelevant to the question of determining proper set-off rules.
Nevertheless, some courts have recently cited the rationale of
Ayers as justification for applying the pro tanto method in FELA
cases. Therefore, a thorough discussion of the Court’s holding in
Ayers is appropriate.
In Ayers, six former employees of Norfolk & Western Railway
who suffered from asbestosis brought FELA claims to recover
damages they suffered as a result of exposure to asbestos.66 At the
end of trial, Norfolk requested that the court “instruct the jury to
apportion damages between Norfolk and other employers alleged
to have contributed to [the plaintiffs’] disease.”67 The trial court
denied this request and instructed the jury “‘not to make a
deduction for the contribution of non-railroad exposures,’ so long
as it found that Norfolk was negligent and that ‘dust exposures at
[Norfolk] contributed, however slightly, to the plaintiff’s
injuries.’”68 The jury awarded damages to all six plaintiffs,
62. FRANK L. MARAIST, THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., & CATHERINE M.
MARAIST, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MARITIME LAW 488 (2d ed. 2009).
63. 538 U.S. 135 (2003).
64. Id. at 157–59.
65. Id. at 159–60.
66. Id. at 140.
67. Id. at 143.
68. Id. at 144.
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resulting in a total of $4.9 million owed by Norfolk. The trial court
denied Norfolk’s motion for a new trial and the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia denied Norfolk’s request for
discretionary review.
On appeal before the Supreme Court, Norfolk argued that the
trial court erred in instructing the jury not to make a deduction
from the damages award for the contribution of non-railroad
asbestos exposures. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the
ruling of the trial court.69 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
began by reciting the relevant portion of the FELA:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in
[interstate commerce], shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier
in such commerce . . . for such injury . . . resulting in whole
or in part from the negligence of . . . such carrier . . . .70
Applying this language, the Supreme Court reasoned that
“[t]he claimants here suffer from asbestosis (an ‘injury’), which is
linked to their employment with Norfolk and ‘result[ed] in whole
or in part from . . . negligence’ by Norfolk. Norfolk is therefore
‘liable in damages . . . for such injury.’”71 The Supreme Court
therefore concluded Norfolk was liable for the entire damages
award because “[n]othing in the statutory text instructs that the
amount of damages payable by a liable employer bears reduction
when the negligence of a third party also contributed in part to the
injury-in-suit.”72
The crux of the Court’s reasoning in Ayers was based on the
FELA’s retention of joint and several liability. The Court went to
great length to document the fact that “the federal and state
reporters contain numerous FELA decisions stating that railroad
employers may be held jointly and severally liable for injuries
caused in part by the negligence of third parties.”73 Thus, the Court
reaffirmed that “joint and several liability is the traditional rule [in
FELA cases]” and concluded that
[o]nce an employer has been adjudged negligent with
respect to a given injury, it accords with the FELA’s
overarching purpose to require the employer to bear the
burden of identifying other responsible parties and
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 166.
45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
Ayers, 538 U.S. at 160.
Id.
Id. at 162 (citing numerous state and federal cases).
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demonstrating that some of the costs of the injury should be
spread to them.74
As that last quote by the Court suggests, much of the Court’s
rationale in Ayers hinged on the fact that FELA defendants, if
found liable to the plaintiff, would possess a right of contribution
against third party tortfeasors. Citing numerous state and federal
cases, the Court stressed that “FELA defendants may bring
indemnification and contribution actions against third parties under
otherwise applicable state or federal law.”75 The Court also pointed
out that “FELA defendants may be able to implead third parties
and thus secure resolution of their contribution actions in the same
forum as the underlying FELA actions.”76 The Court’s holding in
Ayers emphasized that a FELA defendant, having been found
answerable for the entirety of a plaintiff’s injuries, will be given
the opportunity to “demonstrate[e] that some of the costs of the
injury should be spread to [third parties].”77
C. Schadel v. Iowa Interstate Railroad: An Exception to the
“Proportionate Share” Method Emerges for FELA and Jones Act
Cases
In 2004, a little over a year after the Supreme Court decided
Ayers, the Seventh Circuit issued its ruling in the FELA case
Schadel v. Iowa Interstate Railroad.78 In that case, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that the proportionate share method of set-off was
inconsistent with the purpose of the FELA and the rationale of
Ayers.79 Therefore, the pro tanto method is the proper way to
calculate set-offs for nonsettling defendants in FELA cases, the
court held.80 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Schadel is notable
not only for its holding, but for its influence—out of the handful of
jurisdictions that have addressed the set-off issue in subsequent
FELA cases, almost all of them have adopted Schadel’s pro tanto
approach.81 Although these cases purport to follow the Supreme
Court’s rationale in Ayers, Schadel and its progeny represent a
fundamental misreading of Ayers and a departure from the
74. Id. at 165.
75. Id. at 162 (citing numerous state and federal cases).
76. Id. at 165 n.23 (citing as examples Ellison v. Shell Oil Co., 882 F.2d
349, 350 (9th. Cir 1989); Engvall v. Soo Line R. Co., 632 N.W.2d 560, 563
(Minn. 2001)).
77. Id. at 165.
78. See Schadel v. Iowa Interstate R.R., Ltd., 381 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2004).
79. Id. at 675–76.
80. Id. at 678.
81. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court’s well-settled rule espoused in AmClyde.82 For
these reasons, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Schadel deserves
considerable attention.
The facts of Schadel are relatively straightforward. Douglas
Schadel, a conductor for Iowa Interstate Railroad (IAIS), prepared
to board an IAIS train that was stopped at a railroad crossing. 83 All
of a sudden, a vehicle driven by Brenda Kowalewicz flew toward
the railroad crossing, crashed through the gates, and struck
Schadel, propelling him into a nearby ditch.84 Schadel suffered
serious knee injuries and was no longer able to work as a
conductor.85
Schadel filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois, suing the
railroad under the FELA and Kowalewicz under state law. 86 The
railroad filed cross-claims against Kowalewicz for contribution.87
Before the case went to trial, Schadel settled with Kowalewicz for
$100,000.88 Thereafter, in accordance with state law, the district
court dismissed Kowalewicz from the case with prejudice, thereby
extinguishing the railroad’s claims against her for contribution.89
At the jury trial on Schadel’s FELA claim against the railroad,
the district court did not allow the railroad to present any evidence
or argument about the Kowalewicz settlement.90 At the end of the
trial, the court instructed the jury to assign fault only to Schadel or
the railroad.91 The jury found Schadel’s overall damages to be
$450,000.92 It found he was 50% contributorily negligent, which
reduced his recoverable damages to $225,000. Applying a pro
tanto set-off method, the court then reduced that number to
$125,000 to account for the settlement.93 Finally, by agreement of
the parties, the court added another $5,000 to account for a loss of
consortium claim brought by Mrs. Schadel, resulting in a final total
of $130,000 due from the railroad.94
On appeal before the Seventh Circuit, the railroad argued that
the district court erred by applying a pro tanto set-off, contending
the court should have followed AmClyde and applied a
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See infra Part III.
Schadel, 381 F.3d at 673.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 674.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

744

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

proportionate share set-off.95 The Seventh Circuit disagreed,
holding that the proportionate share approach was inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ayers.96 The court started by
posing a hypothetical to illustrate the effect of applying the
proportionate fault method: suppose the jury was allowed to
apportion fault, and found Kowalewicz’s reckless driving was
responsible for 80% of the damages, the railroad was responsible
for 10%, and Schadel himself was responsible for 10%.97
“Applying those proportions to the overall figure of $450,000, that
would mean that Kowalewicz should have paid $360,000; that [the
railroad] would pay $45,000, and that Schadel would have
absorbed $45,000 of the loss (for his own negligence) before
taking the settlement into account.”98 With these numbers in mind,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that “Schadel would wind up
substantially under-compensated under this regime, because he
would also be left [to absorb] $260,000 of Kowalewicz’s liability.
This strikes us as, at best, in serious tension with the rule of joint
and several liability that applies to FELA cases.”99
The Seventh Circuit perceived such tension in spite of the
Supreme Court’s emphasis in AmClyde that “there is no tension
between joint and several liability and a proportionate share
approach to settlements.”100 The Seventh Circuit only briefly
addressed AmClyde and ultimately held that the case was not
applicable to FELA claims.101 In reaching this conclusion, the
Seventh Circuit did not discuss the facts or analysis of AmClyde.
Rather, in a puzzling fashion, the Seventh Circuit cited an earlier
Supreme Court case, Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique,102 as evidence that AmClyde was not controlling
in FELA cases.103 The logic of the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion on
this point is far from clear and will be discussed in more depth in
Part IV. In the end, citing the principles of joint and several
liability and the Supreme Court’s approach in Ayers, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the pro tanto approach was the correct setoff rule for FELA cases.104

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 675.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 675–76.
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220 (1994).
Schadel, 381 F.3d at 678.
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
Schadel, 381 F.3d at 678.
Id.
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Schadel was the first case to address whether Ayers affected a
FELA defendant’s right to receive a proportionate share set-off for
the plaintiff’s settlement with a negligent third party. After the
Seventh Circuit issued this ruling, several other jurisdictions
addressed the same issue in subsequent FELA and Jones Act
cases.105 Almost all of these courts, including the Fourth Circuit
and the Supreme Court of Ohio, have adopted Schadel’s approach
and applied the pro tanto method.106 Because Schadel has become
the “go to” case on this issue, Schadel is the case to which this
Article will devote the most attention.
IV. MAKING SENSE OF THE EXCEPTION FOR FELA AND JONES ACT
CASES: A CRITIQUE OF SCHADEL
After the United States Supreme Court embraced the
proportionate share rule in AmClyde, “the legal system largely
followed suit,”107 especially in areas of federal law that call for
joint and several liability.108 However, Schadel and its progeny
declined to follow AmClyde, giving rise to an exception to the
general rule. Part III provides a critique of that exception. First,
this Part explains the differences between two distinct concepts: on
the one hand, the allocation of fault between nonsettling
defendants; and on the other hand, the calculation of a
proportionate set-off to give a nonsettling defendant credit for the
contributions of a settling defendant. Then, this Part will discuss
the ways the Schadel court conflated these two concepts, resulting
in a misreading of both AmClyde and Ayers.
A. “Apportionment of Liability”: One Phrase, Multiple Meanings
Much of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Schadel focuses on
the phrase “apportionment of liability.” Because the Supreme
Court in Ayers held that apportionment of liability was not allowed
under the FELA, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that a proportionate
share set-off would also be inconsistent with the FELA. This
rationale by the Seventh Circuit ignored the fact that the Ayers
holding referred to apportionment in the context of nonsettling
defendants. Such an oversight is of no small consequence, for
105. See cases cited supra note 1.
106. See, e.g., Benson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 274 Fed. App’x 273 (4th Cir.
2008); Hess v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 835 N.E.2d 679 (Ohio 2005).
107. Michael J. Sturley, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages, 70 LA. L.
REV. 501, 526 (2010).
108. See supra Part II.B.
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apportionment has drastically different implications in the context
of calculating a proportionate share set-off. To understand where
the Schadel court went wrong, it is important to understand the
distinctions between apportionment among nonsettling defendants,
and apportionment for purposes of calculating a proportionate
settlement credit.
The first example of the “apportionment of liability” occurs in
the context of comparative negligence, when a fact-finder
determines the amount of damages owed by each tortfeasor (none of
whom have settled) by calculating the shares of fault attributable to
each defendant as well as to the plaintiff.109 But this is not the only
time that a court employs apportionment. The phrase
“apportionment of liability” is also used in the context of calculating
settlement credits.110 Under AmClyde’s proportionate share method
of set-off, a court is required to assign the percentages of liability for
each party. Courts and commentators often use the phrase
“apportionment of liability” to refer to both of the above
procedures.111 However, in spite of the shared terminology, the two
procedures have drastically different implications.
The first of these procedures, apportionment among nonsettling
tortfeasors, is precisely what the defendant railroad requested in
Ayers. The railroad requested that the court abandon the rule of joint
and several liability by requiring an initial allocation of fault among
third parties who were not before the court (such as prior or
subsequent employers or asbestos manufacturers or suppliers), such
that the railroad would be liable only for the portion of damages
attributable to its employment of the plaintiffs.112 The Ayers Court
rejected the railroad’s request, holding such an approach would
force the plaintiff to bear the burden of identifying negligent third
parties.113 Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, this is a
burden the defendant must bear, the Court reasoned.114 The need for
the defendant to carry this burden distinguishes the Ayers scenario
from settlement scenarios, discussed below.
109. See, e.g., Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003)
(defendant railroad, having been found liable for the plaintiff’s asbestosis,
requested an allocation of fault among itself and other potentially negligent third
parties, such as prior or subsequent employers or asbestos manufacturers); see
generally David Robertson, Eschewing Ersatz Percentages: A Simplified
Vocabulary of Comparative Fault, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 831 (2001) (discussing
the underlying principles behind apportionment and comparative fault).
110. See, e.g., McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 217 (1994).
111. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY §§ 1, 16 (2000).
112. Ayers, 538 U.S. at 143–44.
113. Id. at 165.
114. Id.
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When a court calculates a proportionate share set-off, the court
applies the fact-finder’s assignment of fault among tortfeasors in
order to provide a nonsettling defendant with a settlement credit
proportionate to the fault of a settling tortfeasor. This is the
procedure the Supreme Court unanimously embraced in
AmClyde.115 Unlike the Ayers scenario above, a proportionate
share set-off does not violate joint and several liability. The
Supreme Court made this very clear in AmClyde.116 The
proportionate share set-off does not place a burden on the plaintiff
to identify negligent third parties. Rather, the plaintiff has already
recovered from those third parties, and by his own choice has
extinguished the portion of the liability attributable to those third
parties. Under the proportionate share rule, the defendant still bears
the burden of compensating the plaintiff for the portion of injury
caused by insolvent tortfeasors, but the defendant will not be
forced to bear the cost of the plaintiff’s own decision to settle for
too little.
Keeping the distinctions between these two types of
apportionment in mind, this Part will now analyze Schadel and
examine that case’s misreading of Ayers and its misguided
adoption of the pro tanto rule.
B. Schadel: Misreading Ayers and Misunderstanding Apportionment
The Schadel court adopted the pro tanto rule based on an
inherently flawed reading of both Ayers and AmClyde. The court
misread Ayers when it reasoned that the Ayers rationale makes
sense in the context of settlement. And it misread AmClyde when it
attempted to distinguish that case and the Supreme Court’s earlier
decision in Edmonds v. Compagnie General Transatlantique.
Schadel contended that “Ayers, as we have already noted,
addressed a question very close to the one before us, insofar as it
dealt with the way that liability could be apportioned under
[FELA].”117 This statement illustrates one of the biggest flaws in
the Schadel court’s rationale. The court makes a fatal mistake by
conflating the two distinct versions of apportionment discussed
above—apportionment among nonsettling tortfeasors, as rejected
by Ayers, and the calculation of a proportionate set-off, as
embraced by AmClyde. The scenario in Schadel clearly involved
the latter, for the defendant requested that it receive a credit for the
settlement of the other defendant, and that this credit be calculated
115. See generally AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202.
116. Id. at 220–21.
117. Schadel v. Iowa Interstate R.R., Ltd., 381 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 2004).
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in proportion to the settling defendant’s share of the fault.118 As
explained in the discussion above, although the calculation of such
a set-off does require apportionment, this is clearly not the same
type of apportionment the Court rejected in Ayers.
Schadel also reasoned that “[t]he fact that the [Ayers] Court
rejected a rule under which the railroad’s liability would be
reduced by the negligence of third-party tortfeasors is of no small
interest to us here, since that is exactly what IAIS wants—a
reduction in its liability directly tied to Kowalewicz’s
negligence.”119 Here, the Schadel court again oversimplifies the
analysis, resulting in confusion over the purpose of a settlement
credit. The negligence of a third party tortfeasor is not the basis for
a court’s issuance of a settlement credit to the nonsettling
defendant. Rather, the settlement of the third party forms the basis
for the set-off. This distinction is made clear by the separate
approaches the Supreme Court takes in AmClyde and Ayers.
After discussing Ayers, the Schadel court explained why it felt
AmClyde was not applicable to the FELA.120 The court’s
justification for rejecting AmClyde is perplexing, to say the least.
Schadel declined to follow AmClyde based on that case’s
discussion of an earlier maritime case, Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique.121 In Edmonds, the Supreme Court
rejected a shipowner’s request for a reduction in liability for the
proportionate fault attributed to a stevedore whose liability was
limited by the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s
Compensation Act (LHWCA). Instead, the plaintiff in Edmonds
was permitted to collect from the shipowner the entirety of his
damages, after adjusting for the plaintiff’s own negligence. 122 The
AmClyde Court, in embracing the proportionate share set-off
method, distinguished Edmonds for a very simple reason: the third
party tortfeasor in Edmonds had not settled.123 Therefore, under the
rule of joint and several liability, the shipowner was answerable for
the entirety of the plaintiff’s damages. For this reason, the
AmClyde Court held that Edmonds “merely reaffirm[ed] the wellestablished principle of joint and several liability,” a doctrine that
the Supreme Court emphasized is entirely consistent with the
proportionate share set-off rule.124
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 674.
Id. at 676.
Id. at 678.
Id.
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220–21 (1994).
Id.
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Ironically, the Schadel court quoted this portion of AmClyde,
discussing Edmonds, as grounds for rejecting the proportionate
share rule.125 This justification is extremely puzzling. AmClyde’s
statements regarding Edmonds illustrate exactly why AmClyde
should control, not the other way around. The Schadel court’s
explanation of AmClyde and Edmonds seems confused, to say the
least. It seems that the Seventh Circuit was of the belief that the
facts of Schadel made the case more akin to Edmonds than to
AmClyde. But the exact opposite is true, and AmClyde itself
explains why—“Edmonds did not address the issue in [AmClyde],
the effect of a settlement on nonsettling defendants.”126 For this
reason, the Supreme Court held that the rationale of Edmonds was
not applicable to the Court’s calculation of settlement credits. The
same logic illustrates why the rationale of Ayers should not have
controlled in Schadel. Like Edmonds, the Court’s opinion in Ayers
“merely reaffirm[ed] the well-established principle of joint and
several liability.”127 As AmClyde points out, joint and several
liability does not prevent the application of a proportionate share
set-off.128 The Schadel court suggested otherwise, evidencing an
inherently flawed reading of AmClyde.
C. Settlement is Different: The Bar on Contribution
As discussed above, Ayers is not inconsistent with AmClyde. In
fact, a better view is to look at Ayers and AmClyde as
complementing each other; both cases adhere to the doctrine of
joint and several liability as it applies to two entirely different
circumstances.
On the one hand, in the absence of a settlement, a defendant is
not entitled to an initial allocation of fault to reduce his liability for
the fault of other non-settling entities. Ayers makes clear that in
this scenario, joint and several liability applies, allowing a plaintiff
to recover the entirety of his damages from the FELA–Jones Act
defendant. Ayers also makes clear that in this scenario, if the
nonsettling defendant is found liable, he will be able to pursue a
claim for contribution against negligent third parties who
contributed to the plaintiff’s injury.129
125. Schadel, 381 F.3d at 678 (“These final comments about Edmonds [by
the AmClyde Court], coupled with the approach in Ayers, persuade us that the
pro tanto approach effectively used by the district court is the correct one for a
FELA case.”).
126. AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 220.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 220–21.
129. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 165 (2003).
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On the other hand, if there has been a settlement, the
nonsettling defendant is entitled to a proportionate share reduction
for the settling tortfeasor’s responsibility. AmClyde makes clear
that “there is no tension between joint and several liability and a
proportionate share approach to settlements.”130
The importance of adhering to this bifurcated analysis becomes
clear when one considers the contribution rights that a nonsettling
defendant possesses in each of the above scenarios. This is vital
because Ayers recognizes that FELA–Jones Act defendants are
entitled to spread liability to negligent third parties: “Once an
employer has been adjudged negligent with respect to a given
injury, it accords with the FELA’s overarching purpose to require
the employer to bear the burden of identifying other responsible
parties and demonstrating that some of the costs of the injury
should be spread to them.”131
When there has been no settlement, Ayers makes clear the
nonsettling defendant can achieve this spreading of costs by
seeking contribution from the negligent third party, who can be
impleaded in the underlying FELA action.132 But when there has
been a settlement, contribution will not be available to the FELA
defendant looking to spread costs to a negligent third party who
settled for less than its proportionate share. As a matter of law,
once the negligent third party extinguishes his liability to the
plaintiff through a settlement, the settling defendant will be
immune from claims for contribution from the FELA defendant.133
The same is true under the Jones Act.134
130. AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 220.
131. Ayers, 538 U.S. at 165.
132. Id. at n.23.
133. In FELA claims, it is well settled that a defendant railroad’s right to
recover contribution from a third party is governed by state law. See, e.g.,
Shields v. Consol. Rail Corp., 810 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Our analysis
of the merits begins by recognizing that third-party actions for contribution
arising out of FELA claims are governed by state law.”). The vast majority of
states do not allow a party to recover contribution from a defendant who has
already settled. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108(b) (McKinney 2010)
(“A release given in good faith by the injured person to one tortfeasor as
provided in subdivision (a) relieves him from liability to any other person for
contribution as provided in article fourteen of the civil practice law and rules.”);
see also Jean Macchioroli Eggen, Understanding State Contribution Laws and
Their Effect on the Settlement of Mass Tort Actions, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1707
(1995) (surveying state approaches to contribution and concluding that the vast
majority do not allow contribution actions against defendants who have already
settled).
134. The Jones Act applies only to a seaman’s claim against his or her
employer; “the seaman’s claim against others is governed by general maritime
tort law, if the tort is maritime, or by state law.” FRANK L. MARAIST, THOMAS C.
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Although the Seventh Circuit in Schadel purported to follow
the rationale of Ayers, this bar on contribution illustrates that the
pro tanto method is inconsistent with the Ayers Court’s emphasis
that a jointly and severally liable FELA defendant will be afforded
the opportunity to spread the costs of the plaintiff’s injury to other
negligent third parties. Because a settling defendant is immune
from claims for contribution, the pro tanto method makes it
impossible for a nonsettling defendant to spread the costs to
tortfeasors who have settled for less than their share of the
damages.
The Seventh Circuit in Schadel was seemingly unaware that
such contribution actions are generally barred, for the court
contended that the nonsettling defendant’s contribution rights
presented a “far too complex” question that it expressly reserved
“for another day.”135 Elsewhere in the opinion, the Seventh Circuit
cited Ayers for the proposition that such contribution actions are
allowed.136 This represents yet another example of Schadel’s
misreading of Ayers and its confusion over the distinctions present
in the settlement context. The Ayers Court did encourage FELA
defendants to seek contribution from negligent third parties as a
means of alleviating the burden of joint and several liability. But,
Ayers did so in a scenario that did not involve settlement. When a
negligent third party has settled with the plaintiff, such claims for
contribution are generally not available.137 And because the Ayers

GALLIGAN, & CATHERINE M. MARAIST, ADMIRALTY IN A NUTSHELL 248 (6th ed.
2010). As discussed in supra note 133, under the majority state law rule, once
the seaman settles with a defendant, that defendant is relieved from liability to
other defendants for contribution. The rule is the same under the general
maritime law. See AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 211–12 (holding that contribution
actions against settling defendants should not be allowed, because allowing such
actions would “discourage[] settlement and lead[] to unnecessary ancillary
litigation”).
135. Schadel v. Iowa Interstate R.R., Ltd., 381 F.3d 671, 678–679 (7th Cir.
2004). As discussed in supra note 133, in FELA cases, state law governs such
actions for contribution. In spite of the Seventh Circuit’s comments, it seems
clear that Illinois law (the applicable state law in Schadel) precluded the
defendant railroad from recovering contribution from the settling defendant. See
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/2(d) (West 2010) (“The tortfeasor who settles
with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is discharged from all liability for any
contribution to any other tortfeasor.”).
136. Schadel, 381 F.3d at 676 (“The [Ayers] Court was clear that [its
prohibition of apportionment] did not preclude railroads from seeking
contribution or indemnity from those other tortfeasors, ‘under otherwise
applicable state or federal law,’ . . . but the railroad’s own responsibility was
affected only by the plaintiff’s comparative negligence.”).
137. See supra note 133.
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rationale hinged so heavily on the fact that FELA defendants are
capable of spreading costs by impleading third parties, the analysis
necessarily must change when the negligent third party has settled,
as in Schadel.
AmClyde’s proportionate share method of set-off solves this
problem by providing an equitable method of spreading costs
among responsible parties. Under this rule, a FELA or Jones Act
defendant will be responsible for the plaintiff’s damages (including
portions attributable to insolvent tortfeasors), subject only to
reductions for the proportionate share of third parties with whom
the plaintiff has settled. If the plaintiff reaches a favorable
settlement with such third parties, the plaintiff will enjoy a
windfall, for he will be able to collect from the nonsettling FELA
defendant an amount greater than is required to make the plaintiff
whole.138 Likewise, if the plaintiff agrees to an unwise settlement,
he will suffer the loss, rather than the nonsettling defendant who
was not a party to the settlement agreement. This provides an
efficient and equitable method of sharing costs among responsible
parties. For this reason, the spreading of costs by AmClyde’s
proportionate share rule is consistent with Ayers, not barred by
Ayers.
D. The Remedial Purpose of the FELA Does Not Justify a Departure
from AmClyde
So far, this Article has critiqued Schadel based on that case’s
inconsistency with prior Supreme Court precedent. But Schadel
and its progeny have also justified their adoption of the pro tanto
rule based on policy grounds—namely, the argument that the pro
tanto rule is more consistent with the purposes of the FELA and
the Jones Act. This Part discusses such policy arguments and
concludes that the goals of the FELA and the Jones Act do not
justify a departure from the Supreme Court’s decision in AmClyde.
Illustrative of this policy approach is the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s 2005 decision in Hess v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.139
That case applied the pro tanto set-off method to a plaintiff’s
asbestos claim under the FELA. In that case, the court discussed
both Ayers and Schadel, but ultimately based its conclusion on
policy grounds. The Hess court conceded that Ayers did not
address the calculation of settlement credits.140 Likewise, Hess
conceded that “a proportionate-share approach to settlements is not
138. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 221 (1994).
139. 835 N.E.2d 679 (Ohio 2005).
140. Id. at 689.
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generally inconsistent with joint and several liability.”141
Nevertheless, the Hess court applied the pro tanto rule. The court
reasoned that a pro tanto set-off was more consistent with the
objectives of FELA than the AmClyde approach.142 In enacting the
FELA, “Congress was much more concerned with assuring the
employee’s complete recovery than it was with fairness in loss
allocation among multiple tortfeasors,” the Hess court
contended.143 The court further reasoned that because the FELA
guarantees “full recovery against a railroad whose negligence
played only the slightest part in an employee’s injury or death,
while providing for apportionment of responsibility only between
employer and employee based on comparative fault, the statute
plainly envisions that the employer may be forced to shoulder
disproportionate liability when other parties are partially at
fault.”144
This rationale by the court in Hess, if nothing else, is refreshing
for its candor. Unlike the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Schadel, the
opinion in Hess makes perfectly clear that its holding is grounded
on policy, not on precedent. However, the policy rationale applied
in Hess does not justify a departure from the established Supreme
Court precedent of AmClyde.
Hess correctly points out that the principal policy objective of
the FELA was to ease recovery for injured railroad employees by
eliminating traditional common law defenses.145 However, the
Hess opinion is somewhat misleading when it asserts that one of
the policies embodied in the FELA is “ensuring full recovery
against a railroad whose negligence played only the slightest part
in an employee’s injury or death.”146 Although the doctrine of joint
and several liability is certainly the rule in FELA cases, this policy
is not found in the text of the FELA. Rather, because the FELA
does not speak to the issue, courts have held that the FELA merely
adopted the common law rule—joint and several liability.147
Because the origin of such policy is not the FELA itself, but
the common law, Hess went too far by adopting the pro tanto rule
as a matter of FELA policy. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that because the FELA “is founded on common-law concepts
of negligence and injury,” courts interpreting the FELA must lend
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 686–87; see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512
U.S. 532, 542–44 (1994) (discussing the history of the FELA).
146. Hess, 835 N.E.2d at 689 (emphasis added).
147. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003).

754

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

“great weight” to the common law rule, unless that rule is
“expressly rejected in the text of the statute.”148 The same analysis
applies under the Jones Act.149 The text of the FELA says nothing
about joint and several liability, or about how damages should be
divided between a settling defendant and a nonsettling defendant.
In such a situation, the Supreme Court has made clear that judges
should look to the common law for answers.150
AmClyde and its proportionate share rule represent the clear
federal common law approach for calculating settlement credits.
AmClyde is the first and last time that the Supreme Court has
spoken on the issue. AmClyde’s approach has since become the
majority rule under both state and federal laws that still apply joint
and several liability.151 This well-established rule should not be
abrogated simply because of the FELA’s remedial purpose; as the
Supreme Court has emphasized, although the FELA was drafted
with a clear goal in mind, “[i]t does not follow, however, that this
remedial purpose requires us to interpret every uncertainty in the
Act in favor of employees.”152 Under the Supreme Court’s
approach to interpreting the FELA, because the statute does not
speak to the issue of third party liability or settlement credits, the
remedial goals of the FELA and the Jones Act do not warrant an
abrogation of the well-established common law rule of AmClyde.
Therefore, in FELA and Jones Act cases, courts should apply the
proportionate share method of set-off, rather than the pro tanto
method.

148. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 544 (“Because FELA is silent on the issue of
negligent infliction of emotional distress, common-law principles must play a
significant role in our decision.”); see also, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell,
549 U.S. 158, 168 (2007) (“The fact that the common law applied the same
causation standard to defendant and plaintiff negligence, and FELA did not
expressly depart from that approach, is strong evidence against Missouri’s
disparate standards.”); Monessen S.W. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 337–
38 (1988) (holding that, because FELA abrogated some common law rules
explicitly but did not address “the equally well-established doctrine barring the
recovery of prejudgment interest, . . . we are unpersuaded that Congress
intended to abrogate that doctrine sub silentio.”).
149. See, e.g., Simeon v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1430 (5th Cir.
1988) (“[W]e must construe the FELA, and hence the Jones Act, consistent with
the common law, except where the statute explicitly departs from the common
law or has been judicially construed to do so.”).
150. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 544; Sorrell, 549 U.S. at 168.
151. See sources cited supra note 7.
152. Sorrell, 549 U.S. at 171.
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V. CONCLUSION: COURTS SHOULD REAFFIRM AMCLYDE AS THE
PROPER RULE IN FELA AND JONES ACT CASES
The debate over the best way to calculate settlement credits is
not a new one. For many years, courts disagreed over whether the
pro tanto rule or the proportionate share method provided the best
set-off rule. But once the Supreme Court expressed its preference
for the proportionate share method in AmClyde, the debate all but
ended. Both state and federal courts joined the Supreme Court’s
approach, embracing AmClyde as the general rule for calculating
set-offs.
But shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the
2003 case of Ayers, the debate was suddenly reignited. Even
though Ayers did not speak to the set-off issue, the Seventh Circuit
in Schadel held that the rationale of Ayers necessitated a different
approach for FELA and Jones Act cases. Several other
jurisdictions have agreed. These courts are in error. Their holdings
are a result of a misreading of Ayers. Again, Ayers said nothing
about calculating settlement credits, and ultimately, like Edmonds,
“merely reaffirm[ed] the well-established principle of joint and
several liability.”153 And as the Supreme Court has emphasized,
“there is no tension between joint and several liability and a
proportionate share approach to settlements.”154 Therefore, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ayers provides no justification for
abrogating the well-established proportionate share set-off rule.
As one prominent maritime scholar recently observed, after the
Supreme Court adopted the proportionate share rule in AmClyde,
“the legal system largely followed suit.”155 FELA and Jones Act
cases should not be exceptions. In future FELA and Jones Act
cases, courts should decline to adopt the Schadel approach, and
instead adhere to the Supreme Court’s decision in AmClyde.

153. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220 (1994).
154. Id.
155. Sturley, supra note 107, at 526.

